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the condemnation was to destroy such a substantial portion of the business
building as to require the discontinuation of further business activity at that
location, the business was deemed to be completely located on that portion
of the petitioner's land that was condemned. The supreme court's reversal
holds that for purposes of a statutory award the business was deemed completely located on petitioner's adjoining uncondemned land, although a substantial portion of the business was taken with the land actually condemned.
The Supreme Court of Florida has characterized the power of eminent
domain as "one of the most harsh proceedings known to the law." 39 The
court has further pointed out that one of the distinguishing characteristics of
American democracy is the emphasis placed on the individual and the protection of his personal property rights against the state and all other assailants.40
"The State may condemn ... property for public use and pay a just compensation for it, but it will not be permitted to grab or take it by force.'"' 1 The
obvious purpose of the Florida statute allowing an award for business damage
resulting from a partial taking of the land upon which the business was
located is to protect the owner from what amounts to an appropriation of
his property without any compensation whatever. If all of a business is
taken when land is condemned, the fact that a business was located on the
land is taken into account when fixing the value of the land.42 Under the
Florida statute, business damage suffered by a business standing on the condemnee's adjoining land is obviously compensable as well. To refuse an owner
such a recovery because only a part of his business was located on the remaining property would be to place that business in a limbo between compensability and noncompensability and to defeat the ends of justice to be
promoted by the statute.
WILLIAM

E.

WILLIAMS

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN
STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,
89 S. Ct. 733 (1969)
Petitioners, public school students in Des Moines, Iowa, wore black
armbands to school to protest the war in Viet Nam. The principals of their
respective schools had previously adopted and published a policy that
specifically prohibited the wearing of armbands to class. In accordance with
this regulation the students were suspended until they returned without armbands. Petitioners, claiming a violation of first amendment rights, sought
39.

Peavy-Wilson Lumber Co. v. Brevard County, 159 Fla. 311, 314, 31 So. 2d 483, 485

(1947).
40. State Rd. Dep't v. Tharp, 146 Fla. 745, 749, 1 So. 2d 868, 870 (1941).
41. Id. at 749, 1 So. 2d at 870.
42. State Rd. Dep't v. Bramlett, 179 So. 2d 137, 141 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
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relief under the 1964 Civil Rights Act.1 They sought to enjoin school officials
from disciplining them and also requested nominal damages. The district
court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the school authorities acted
reasonably to prevent unnecessary disturbance of school activities and discipline. 2 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit was equally divided,
thereby affirming the decision of the district court. 3 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari and HELD, students participating in a nondisruptive expression of opinion are protected by the first and fourteenth amendments
and cannot constitutionally be punished by school authorities in the absence
of a clear showing of material interference with, or substantial disruption of,
school activities. Judgment reversed, Justices White and Stewart concurring
separately, Justices Harlan and Black dissenting.4
Although the issue has been much litigated in the state and lower federal
courts, this case marks the first time that the Supreme Court has enumerated
the first amendment feedoms of speech and expression as applied to students
in their relations with public school administrators. The opinion by Mr.
Justice Fortas follows closely the trend in those courts to extend due process
principles to students.
For a long time the courts refrained from interfering in the academic
community and allowed wide disciplinary discretion on the part of school
administrators.5 Only in cases of flagrant abuse of this discretion or of unlawful action did the courts intervene on behalf of students.6 Recently, however, students' rights as secured by the federal and state constitutions, have
begun to receive judicial protection in disciplinary matters.7 A major factor
leading to this reversal of attitude by the courts is the recognition that in
8
student suspensions or dismissals:
[T]he harm to the student may be far greater than that resulting from
the prison sentence given to a professional criminal .... A law school
student dismissed for cheating will not be admitted to practice even if
he is able to complete his legal education.
Admitting the seriousness of disciplinary action against studentsq where

1. 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1964).
2. 258 F. Supp. 971 (S.D. Iowa 1966).
3. 383 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1967).
4. 89 S. Ct. 733 (1969).
5. E.g., Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 102 So. 637 (1925); Gott v. Berea College,
156 Ky. 376, 161 S.W. 204 (1913).
6. See Tanton v.McKenney, 226 Mich. 245, 197 N.W. 510 (1924); Gott v. Berea College,
156 Ky. 376, 379, 161 S.W. 204, 206 (1913).
7. Van Alstyne, The Judicial Trend Toward Student Academic Freedom, 20 U. FLA. L.
REV. 290 (1968). The courts still decline to intervene in strictly scholastic affairs where
the only issue is the student's failure to meet required academic standards. See, e.g., Mustell
v. Rose, 211 So. 2d 489 (Ala. 1968).
8. Seavey, Dismissal of Students: "Due Process:" 70 HARV. L. REv. 1406, 1407 (1957).
9. See Woods v. Wright, 334 F.2d 369, 375 (5th Cir. 1964).
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they have a legally protected interest in remaining in school, 10 the courts have
overcome their historic unwillingness to impose constitutional standards in
areas where the competence of the judiciary admittedly may not be great."
There are two considerations for the courts in their protection of students'
rights. First: Was the student's conduct in fact punishable? Second: Was the
punishment given in a proper manner? With respect to the latter question,
the high point in the development of student procedural due process came
in Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education. 2 There the Court of Ap-

peals for the Fifth Circuit laid down minimum guidelines to be followed in
public college disciplinary actions of a serious nature. Each student must be
given adequate notice of the specific charges against him, an explanation
of the grounds for the charges, the names of witnesses against him, and an
opportunity to present a defense at a fair hearing. These "rudimentary elements of fair play"" '3 have since been expanded to include: the student's
right to examine, in advance of the hearing, that evidence on which the
school bases its charges;' 4 the right to question witnesses against him at the
hearing;"r the right to have his own counsel to advise him at the proceedings;16 and the right to have those administrators at the hearing act as jurors,
weighing and deciding upon only such evidence as is presented at the
hearing.17 Yet, the courts have not admitted that the student is entitled to
the formality of a trial, in the usual sense of that term.'8 These procedural
standards are, for the most part, accepted by public college administrations
today.' 9
The emphasis has been placed on the procedural aspects of due process,
and few strides had been made prior to the instant case toward the protection
of students' substantive rights. The courts have concentrated on how, rather
than when or for what activities, students may be punished. With respect to
the latter, first amendment guarantees of free speech and expression become
important. In this substantive due process area the question now becomes:
Did the student have a right to do what he did, and was the subsequent
punishment by the school officials an abridgement of his rights? In dealing
with this question the courts-and school administrators generally-are

faced with the intricate problems of balancing the individual's right of selfexpression with the state's interest in maintaining order in the daily life of
the institution. Admitting the necessity of deciding the relative weights of
10.

See United States v. Atkinson, 323 F.2d 733, 763 (5th Cir. 1963).

11. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 634, 640 (1943) (compulsory
flag salute unconstitutional).
12.

294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).

13. Id. at 159.
14. Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649, 651 (W.D. Mo. 1967).
15. Id. at 652.
16. Goldwin v. Allen, 54 Misc. 2d 94, 281 N.Y.S.2d 899 (Sup. Ct. 1967). But see Madera
v. Board of Educ., 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1028 (1968).

17. Zanders v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747, 759 (W.D. La. 1968).
18. Jones v. State Bd. of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190, 202 (M.D. Tenn. 1968).
19. E.g., University of Florida Handbook, University Regulations on Student Conduct
91 (1968) (enumerating the student rights that are essential for "basic procedural fairness"
in disciplinary hearings).
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competing interests on the specific circumstances of each case, 20 the courts
have provided a few very general limitations on the regulatory power of administrators. The regulations must be aimed at curtailing only such activity
21
as would present a clear and present danger to the operation of the school;
they must not be vague and therefore susceptible to uncertain interpretation;22
and they must be free from discretionary application by the administrators
to the extent that such discretion would act as a prior restraint on individual
freedoms. 23 With such activity by the lower courts it was inevitable that the
Supreme Court also would need to consider students' rights of free speech.
The instant case is not the first time the Supreme Court has considered
the first amendment rights of students. As early as 192824 the Court referred
to the rights of teachers and students to teach and learn a foreign language
in public school. In that case a prohibition against teaching German was
found as applied to be "arbitrary and without reasonable relation to any end
25
within the competency of the state."
Twenty years later in West Virginia v. Barnette26 the Court held that a
regulation requiring a compulsory flag salute in the schools violated the
freedom of religion guarantee of the first amendment. Mr. Justice Jackson,
speaking for the Court, said: "The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied
to the States protects the citizen against the State itself and all of its creatures- Boards of Education not excepted." 27 The highly discretionary functions of boards of education must be performed within the limits of the Bill
of Rights.2 8 Using this same rationale, the Court has on several occasions intervened to protect students' freedom of, or from, religion. 29 Most recently, in
striking down the Arkansas "anti-evolution" law Mr. Justice Fortas summed
30
up the issue facing the Court:
Judicial interposition in the operation of the public school system of
the Nation raises problems requiring care and restraint. Our courts,
however, have not failed to apply the First Amendment's mandate in
our educational system where essential to safeguard the fundamental
values of freedom of speech and inquiry and of belief.
20. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 508-09 (1951); accord, Schneider
v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939).
21. Hammond v. South Carolina State College, 272 F. Supp. 947, 950 (D.S.C. 1967); see
Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1966); Dickey v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ.,
272 F. Supp. 613, 618 (M.D. Ala. 1967), vacated as moot, 412 F.2d 515 (5th Cir. 1968).
22. Dickson v. Sitterson, 280 F. Supp. 486, 498 (M.D.N.C. 1968).
23. Hammond v. South Carolina State College, 272 F. Supp. 947, 950 (D.S.C. 1967).
24. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
25. Id. at 402; see Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
26. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
27. Id. at 637.
28. Id.
29. Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (invalidated statute providing for prayer reading
in school); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (religious teaching in public
school unconstitutional).

30.

Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968).
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With this characterization of the academic community as one where
freedom of expression in the open exchange of ideas is to be carefully preserved, the Court has dealt with the related problem of teachers' academic
freedom.3a The Court recognized the need for constitutional protection when
it stated that academic freedom is "a special concern of the First Amendment,
which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom."

32

The rationale in these first amendment cases, in conjunction with the
recent case of In re Gault33 in which the Court declared that in delinquency

hearings a juvenile is entitled to procedural rights of due process similar to
those afforded to adults in criminal trials, led the Court to its decision in
the instant case. The Court had to answer several questions: (1) What rights
of free speech and expression does a student have at a state school? (2) Can the
action of wearing armbands be classified as "speech" within the protection
of the first amendment? (3) At what point does this speech cease to be
protected, thereby subjected to state police power regulation?
Guided by Barnette, Gault, and similar cases the Court concluded that
students as well as adults are fully protected by the first amendment guarantees of free speech and expression. Attending public school is now recognized
as a right, rather than a privilege, in return for which the student may not
be required to surrender his constitutional liberties "at the schoolhouse
gate."

34

Recognizing the protection of students by the first amendment, the Court
defined the scope of this protection. The wearing of armbands, unaccompanied by any other actions, disruptive or otherwise, on the part of the
demonstrators was classified as "closely akin to pure speech, ' '3 5 rather than
to the more tenuous "symbolic speech" 36 and thereby is afforded full first
amendment security. This would apply, however, only where the purpose of
the armband is the expression of ideas or opinions, and in the absence of any
showing that the student had a legitimate purpose of expression is carefully
37
distinguished from clothing or haircut regulations.
The third question presented to the Court encompasses the real substance of the issue. The right of free speech is not absolute, and abuse of
this freedom may be punished by the state in the exercise of its police
31.

Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). There the Court invalidated

a New York statute that deprived a teacher of his job for mere knowing membership in
the Communist Party without the specific intent to further its unlawful ends. Such a
deprivation of freedom of expression and association is not justified by any sufficient state
interest.
32. Id. at 603; Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 112 (1959).
33. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
34. 89 S. Ct. 733, 736 (1969).
35. Id. at 736.
36. Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
482 (1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).

37. 89 S. Ct. at 737; see, e.g., Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 392 F.2d 697
(5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 856 (see dissenting opinion by Justice Douglas to
denial of certiorari); Davis v. Firment, 269 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. La. 1966).
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powers.38 As Justice Black reiterated in his dissent, the rights of free speech
"do not mean that anyone with opinions or beliefs to express may address a
group at any public place and at any time." 39 Some expression in some contexts exceeds the bounds of first amendment protection. In the instant case
the students had a legitimate right to express their opposition to the Viet
Nam war, and the administration had a legitimate fear of disruption, which
it had the aitthority and duty to control. This authority, however, did not
extend to the supression of controversial ideas or to the stifling of opinions
in the name of preventing disorder, in the absence of a clear showing that
it is necessary to avoid "material and substantial interference with school
work or discipline." 40 Here again is the familiar "dear and present danger"
test emerging in its purest form to protect free thought in the "marketplace
of ideas" - the classroom. The danger to the school must be immediate, rather
than possible, probable, or future. Moreover, the danger must be of disruptions amounting to "a serious substantive evil that rises far above public
inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest."4 1 This serious limitation on the school's
powers to regulate discipline makes it a practical requirement for the school
to justify such regulation by showing that it was absolutely necessary.
In order to punish demonstrators the school must further show that the
disruption was made by the demonstrators themselves rather than by others
reacting to the protected expression. 42 Justice Fortas emphasized the importance of this distinction in his reference to two lower court cases. In Burnside v. Byars4 3 students wore "freedom buttons" to school in violation of a
school regulation, but otherwise conducted themselves properly. What little
disruption did occur was made by others reacting to the demonstrators rather
than by the demonstrators themselves. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit properly enjoined the enforcement of the prohibitive regulation, thereby protecting this form of free speech. In Blackwell v. Issaquena County
Board of Education,44 handed down by the same court on the same day, an
opposite holding was reached. In this case, however, the demonstrators had
harrassed others and created a disruptive disturbance that was inseparable
from the wearing of the "freedom buttons." Under these circumstances the
wearing of the buttons could be legitimately restricted. In both cases the same
test was used. The Court also used this test in the instant case: The exercise of protected first amendment freedoms can only be restricted by the
state under circumstances where the restriction is reasonable and necessary to
prevent a material and substantial disruption by those who would exercise
their fundamental rights.
38. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
39. 89 S. Ct. at 742; Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965). See also Adderley v.
Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
40. 89 S. Ct. 733, 739; see Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
41. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1959).
42. 89 S. Ct. at 740. Compare Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966), with
Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966).
43. 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966).
44. 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966).
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This test leaves several problems unsolved. First: What guidelines are to
be followed to determine the reasonableness of, and the necessity for, the
regulation of student conduct. Second: Since every demonstration is at least
minimally disruptive, with some disturbance inevitable by definition, how
much is the school required to tolerate before the administration may constitutionally step in? Third: Since this case deals with secondary school
children supported by their parents, would the results be the same where
the students are opposed by administration and parents alike? This parentchild relationship could pose radically different problems with respect to the
students' rights. Fourth: May these rights of free expression be exercised anywhere within the school grounds at the discretion of the demonstrators, or
may they be limited by the administration to areas prescribed for such activity?
One indication of a line of reasoning to be followed in answering the last
question, and possibly relating to the first three, may be found in the 1966
case of Adderley v. Florida.45 The Court there upheld trespass convictions of
students who demonstrated on the grounds of a jail. Justice Black concluded
for the Court that a jail is not a place normally open to the public or dedicated to public discussion and education as are libraries or parks. A jailyard
is not a proper forum for the exchange of ideas. This concept of proper forum
may be one limiting factor to freedom of expression to the extent that it is
applied to put certain parts of the school "off limits" to students and especially to demonstrators. Just as the presence of demonstrators at the jail
posed a serious potential threat to the security and operation of that institution, so might it be said that the presence of demonstrators in a closed
faculty meeting or in the president's office presents a similarly unnecessary
danger. If such places are not normally open to the public, demonstrators
may likewise be excluded, if the courts choose to apply Adderley in this
manner.
Within the restrictions of the "proper forum" doctrine and the other
lurking problems suggested above, the Court has in the instant case delineated
and clarified the first amendment rights of students in the school context
to be coextensive with those of the general public. The principal effect of
this decision is to allow students an opportunity to make their opinions
known while keeping them within the existing social and political structure.
In granting students this outlet for their expression, the Court has clarified
the crucial distinction between disruptive behavior and legitimate expression.
PETER L. DEARING

45.

385 U.S. 39 (1966).
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